'445 U. S. 222,235 (1980) (holding that the ·'duty to disclose under� iO(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information'').
'463 U. S. 646,654 (1983) (holding that the duty to disclose nonpublic information arises nut from the �lctual possession of the in formation but from :1 fiduciarv relationship with the corporation or the seller of securities).
· '521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997) (holding that "a perso n who t rades in se curiti es fo1· rc:rsonal profit. using confidential information misaprrupriated in bre ach ot' a fiduciary dutv to the source of the information,'· is guilty of violating·� lO(h) and Rule IOb-5).
'The SEC reacted to these holdings in several ways. Following Cliiureila, in an attempt to narrow the scope of the holding, the SEC enacted Rule 14c-3(a), whose validity in some contexts re mains doubtful. Sec O'Hagan, 52L U.S. at 672 n.\7 (1997) . Then, in respo nse to Dirks the SEC had initially supported tbe co u rt ' s ru l ing, exempting selecti ve disclosure to investment analysts. Later on, the SEC retreated from its e arli er position and attempted to expand Dirks' "person al bc:ncfit" test. Sec SEC v. Stevens, Litigation Release No. 12813, 1991 SEC LEXlS 451 (Mar. 19 , Jl)9I) ( a ttem pti ng to hold Stevens liable for informing market analysts about earnings in onlv added fuel to the fire of the academic debate already ragmg ,.. ' . 6 on the 1ssue. The most intriguing feature of the debate on insider trading is that all contributors seek to promote the same goal: enhancing the efficiency' and liquidity" of securities markets.9 Substantial dis agrcernent exists. however, as to how the ban on insider trading affects the twin goals of efficiency and liquidity. Critics of the ban on insider trading maintain that permitting insiders to take advan tage of inside information is the best way to ensure efficient share prices."' Given that insiders have ready access to inside informa tion, critics argue that permitting them to derive private benefit from such information guarantees that new information \vill reach the market rapidly, and consequently, that share prices will adjust quickly to reflect the new information.11 By contrast, proponents of the ban contend that repealing it will diminish market efficiency.'2 Since insiders seek to maximize their own gain, not market effi ciency, proponents contend that absent a prohibition on insider trading, insiders would withhold valuable information from the market until it is optimal for them to trade, thereby compromising the efficiency of the capital market.13 order to increase his reputation, although the action ultimately settled). Finding this latter step ineffective, the SEC enacted the Fair Disclosure Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2001 ) , on August 24, 2000, partially reversing Dirks' holding. For a description of the SEC's historical initiatives, see Donald C. Langevoort. Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 7 (-, Va. L. Rev. 1023 , J 034-36 (1990 .
''Jonathan R. Macey. Insider Trading: Economics, Politics, and Policy 7 (1991) ("A great deal of debate has concerned how much harm insider trading docs to investors."). !vlaccy, perhaps the leading authority on the matter. writes: "Those ... who takt: a ·tough minded' scientific or economic approach to the debate [about insider trading] inevitably end by condoning the practice on efficiency grounds that seem to others implausible. if not incredible.·· !d. at 2 (emphases added).
't\ securities market is efficient when share prices reflect all available information about the traclecl companies and their businesses. Eugene F. Fama. Efficient Capital Markets: c\ Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. Fin. 383, 383 ( l Y70) .
'A securities market is liquid when investors can buy or sell shares on vcrv short notice. Macey. supra note 6, at 7.
··See id. at ll ("All sides of the debate about insider trading have argued that the rules they pre fer will enhance market efficiency and liquidity.").
;n See id. "See iJ. Shifting the focus of the debate to a contractual sphere, Carlton and Fischel framed the matter as an issue of e fficient allocation of property rights in inside inform ation_'" Oddly, however, they as well as other Law and Economics scholar s have limited the list of potenti al entitlement holder s to t wo: tl�e managers and the share holders_15 In other words, the scope of the inquiry has been restricted to the boundaries of the firm. ;\ s J o nathan iVIaccy writes: "[T)he debate about insider trading is redlly a debate about how to allocate a property right within a firm.,.,{, \Vhen insider trading is permit ted, m anage rs '>vill reduce their salary demands by an amount equal to the expected gain from insider trading, therefore benefiting the shareholders wh o will pay !ower salaries to the man agers. 17 The choice between paying higher salaries and permitting insider trading ultimately depends on the particular characteristics of each individual firm and on its managers' attitudes toward risk.1�
Because different firms will choose to allocate property rights in in side information diftercntly, a pmverfui argument in insider trading literature suggests that shareholders and managers should be per mitted to contract over the allocation of property rights in inside information.19 Moreover, several schol ars have pointed out that the prohibition on insider trading does not benefit the shareholders be cause the ban does not transfer the value of the information to the prolong the period prior to disclosun�··): Joel Seligman. The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Co;;cerning Nonpuhlic Information. 73 Geo. LJ. 1083, !119, 1121 (1985) . Stan. L Rev. 857,866-72 (1983) .
� � "See id. at 861, 863 (analyzing shareholders· and managers· entitl ements but stating that " [w] hethcr insider trading is bendicial depend:; on whether the property right in information is more valuable to the firm's managers or to the firm's inve�tors" and structuring its analysis around this point but acknowledging that "the arguments for and against insider trading mav c;pply equally to trading bv others''): see, e.g., David D. Haddock & J onathan R. 1-l!accy, A Coasian Model of !nsidCi Trading, 80 Nw. U_ L. Rev. 1449 Rev. ,1449 Rev. -50 (1986 .
"Macey, supra note 6. at 4 (emph?.sis added).
17 See Macey, supra note 6. at 5-12: Haddock & Macey, supra note 15, at l463. "See Macey. supra note 6, at 4--12.
,. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 14, at 861--66 (applying the Coasc theorem to insider trading analysis) : Haddock & Iv!accy, supra rwte l5, at 1451, 1468 (calling for a contractual resolution of the insider trading dilemma).
shareholders, but rather to professional investors.2° Consequently, the blanket prohibition on insider tradi ng occasions a loss to the shareholders as a group without offering them any redeeming benefits. The shareholders lose twice: T hey pay higher salaries to managers, and they do not get the value of the inside information.
The seeming superiority of a contractual solution to the problem of insider trading has led several leac!in� C1.1mmentators to conclude that the existing ban on insider trauing diminishes the welfare of shareholders.:' Moreover, some of these commentators have even suggest ed that the ban on i nsider trading is the result of the dispro portionate political power of market a na l ysts who manipulated the political process to e ffect a wealth transfer from the managers to themselves.
22
We challenge both these conclusions and the analysis on which they rest. In particular, we posit that existing analysis is misguided as it rests on the erroneous assumption that property rights to in side information must be allocated within the boundaries of the firm-namely, either to shareholders or to managers. Conse quently, existing analysis ignores the possibility of awarding the property right of inside information to market analysts. This omis sion stems, in our view, from the analytical convention that property right entitlements must be positively assigned to a particu lar well-defined actor or group-in this context, managers or shareholders. We observe that property rights may also be "as signed" negatively to deny a certain group (managers) the use of a particular resource (inside information) in order to afford free ac cess to the resource to anyone who wishes to utilize it (market analysts). We utilize this observation to develop an innovative market approach to the problem of insider trading.
The adoption of a market-wide approach to the problem of in sider trading enables us to p resent three novel insights. "See Macey, supra note 6. at 3-5: Haddock & Macey. supra note 15, at 1468. "Sec Michael P. Dooley. Fundamentals of Corporation Law 816-57 (1995) (explaining why the SEC targeted markt:t analysts as part of its enforcement program): Macey. supra note 6, ai 17-2.0 (describing to whom the insider trading reg u lation was sole!); Haddock & Macc:y. supra n ote 20. at 328-29 (same).
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First, we show that when market analysts are taken into consid eration, it becomes apparent that the choice between insiders and market analysts raises a broader policy inquiry: 'vVhich of the two groups�insiders or analysts�wi!l better enhance efficiency in in formation and capital markets'):' 'vVe demonstrate that analysts outperform insiders in providin g efficiencv to both markets. �' in ,;,�cmities rn<lrkt:ts. analvst5 orice out of the market.2" This dominance would come at a dear price.
The existence of market analysts generates valuable positive exter nalities that woul d be lost if insiders were to control securities markets. A com pe titiv e analysts' market p roduces efficient infor mation markets.�" Competition among anal ysts is responsible for the plethora of i nform ation sources. such as financial newspapers, financial klcvision channels, and financial web sites. These infor matiun suurces improve investors· understanding of financial mJrkc:ts anJ enhance their confidence in them, which in turn in creases both the number of investors and their wi l lingness to invest. Moreover, these information sources improve o ve ral l pric ing by other professional investors. Additionally, a vibran t analysts' market supports the investment banking market and draws foreign corporations from a less d eve lo ped analysts' market to issue shares and list them in countries with a better developed analysts' market.'1 Given the numerous po sit ive external ities generated by a vibrant analysts' market-all of which t1ow directly from the prohibition on insider trading and would not exist otherwise-the issue of in sider trading cannot be left to contractual arrangement on a firm by firm basis. In deciding whether to permit insider trading, firms only consider their gains and losses, and exclude from the calculus the broad er societal interest in having developed financial markets.
In a contractual regime, firms who stand to gain from permitting insider trading will permi t the practice vvithout taki ng into account the social cost of their decisions. Our analysis indicates that the so ci;; \l cost of permitting insider trading may far outweigh the private gain to the individual firms that would otherwise permit it. The de cision as to whether to permit insider trading should not be th e subject of private contracting; the imposition of a blanket prohibi tion is the most efficient way to address the issue.
Final ly, our anal ytical framework illuminJtes two specific prob lems w ith which the SEC and the Supreme Court have long grappled. The first is the problem of ·'selective disclosure," which involves discl osure of inside information by m angers to a small The ar ti cle consists of fo ur parts. In Part I, we will present our market model in which fo ur gr o u ps of investors-insiders, informa tion traders, liquidity traders, and noise traders-i nteract. Using
"F air Disclusure Regulation,;, 17 CF.R. � 243 (2000) . In these regulatiUJb . the SEC has changed comp l e t e l y its earlier position of supp � )rting selective disclosure tu invt�stment a n alv�ts. Sec Langc1·oon. su pra n o te 5, at l035-36. "S ee infra Section iV.A. '' See id. '' Securities E. xchangc Act of 1934 � l4e. 15 U. S.C.S. § 7Sn(c). '' United Stiites v. O'Hagan. 521 U.S. 642 . 672 n.l7 (1997) ("We leave for another day. when the issue re quires decision. the legitimacy of Rule 14e-3(a) ;JS <l ppiied to 'warehousing· .... " ) .
"' See infn1 Section IV. B.
this model, we will assess the effect of each group on efficient stock pricing. In Part II, we will analyze the conditions for attaining effi cient and liquid financial markets. We will demonstrate that analysts provide superior efficiency and liquidi ty to financial mar kets relative to insiders. Tn Part IIL we will unveil and describe the positive externalities anaiysts' competition gc ner<itcs fo r the infor mation market and the investment banking :nJustry. Finally, in Part IV, we will point out and assess the implic:tions of our market approach for the ongoing de bate about the regulation of selective disclosure and ware housing.
I. THE MARKET MECI-IANIS;-.. 1
In this Part we sketch out a new model for understanding the market dynamics affecting information and its impact upon stock pricing and liquidity. This conceptualization enables us to show that the choice facing policymakers in regulating insider trading is whether to set up an insider-based information market or an ana lyst-based information market. Comparing the two options, we observe that the insiders ' market is highly inefficient relative to the analysts' market. As a result, efficiency-minded policymakers should favor the development of an analyst-based information market.
A. Th e J'vlarker Players
The capitai market consists of four groups of players: insiders, information trade rs, liquidity traders, and noise traders."" In siders have access to inside information '1 due to their proximity to the firm. They also have the knowledge and ability to evaluate this in formation and to price it.
Information traders, the second group, lack access to inside in formation, but are willing and able to devote resources to gathering "' For a detailed analysis of noise traders in c:lpita! markets. see J. Bradford De Long et a!.. Noise Trader Risk in financial Markets, 9S J. Pol. Econ. 703 (1990) .
'' We use the term "inside information'· to describe a piece of firm-specific information produced within the firm and unknown to the public. After public disclosure, the piece of information transforms into "public information.'· However. for claritv"s sake, in our analvsis we nevertheless continue to rdcr to this information as "insid e information,'' traci -ng it to irs origins. Information traders are c om pri sed of t\\ () sub-groups: mw!ysrs and srock tJickcrs. i\nalysts t1 re experts specializing in pro viding analytical services regard i ng the value of inc!iviclua1 fi rms as we ll as the market as a whole. In this Article, we group under the term ''analysts" a wide range of professional investors who produce fi nancial analytical work upon which they n2se their investment decisions. Like the insiders, analysts have the ability and knowl edge to collect, evaluate, and price information. Stock pickers, too, collect and evaluate information, but they are less efficient than analysts in performing these functions. As a result, stock pickers are "slower" at gathering. analyzing, and responding to new infor mation. and the accuracy of their evaluations is inferior to that of analysts. Therefore, stock pickers often buy information and ana lytical services from analysts. trad e to capture the value of their informational ad van tage ."5 When the y observe underva luati on, the y buy, the re by rai si ng th e price; conv erse ly. when the y sp ot overvaluat i on, they se ll. the re by caus ing the p rice to drop. Sinc e pr ic e change s are always comp are d with some c<liculatecl va lue. a trade is triggered whenever the price chanQ.e is nul warran ted bv th e cu rren tlv knuwn information.
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(_l iv�n th is in\·l�strnent strategy� trading a g ainst a p�l rty \\' ith sup!_ -� -rior info rm cltinn wi ll result in a loss. Liq uid ity traders, who trad e irres pe ctive of new informati on for ex ampl e. selling for li quid ity or bu yi ng fo r saving-will trad e re gardle�s of the 2ctions of insi de rs and information traders. 1t is importan t to no te that insider tr ading do cs not harm liquidity trad ers. '" Ob viously, when insi der trading has no effe ct on stock pri ce s, liquid ity traders will not be harmed. Counte rin tuitive ly, howeve r, ev en wh en insider trading do es affe ct stock prices (for example, pri ce s rise when insiders buy) , insider trading does not ad ve rsely affe ct liqu id ity traders." In deed, if liquidi ty trade rs tr ad e in the same ma nner as do insi ders-for example, buyi ng wh en insi ders buy-the y lose since the y could have bought at a lo we r pri ce if the insi ders were not buyi ng as well. Ho wever, if liq uidity traders tr ad e agai nst insiders, the y gai n si nce the y woul d have bought for a hi ghe r pric e abse nt se lli ng by insi ders. The same is true wh en li qu idity traders sel l. Liqu id it y traders who foll ow the st rate gy of buying and hold ing a portfolio do not lose on av e rage to either in side rs or information traders. Wh en the y buy a port fo li o. they lose on some tr an sac tions (when the y buy toge the r wi th insiders or in format io n traders) and gain on othe rs (when the y buy wh en insiders or inf ormati on traders are se lli ng) . Li kewise. wh en the y sell th e portfol io. th ey lose at time s and gain at others. On av e rage th ey earn the market re turn for the period of their ho ld ing. " Only '' See. e.!! .. Eu!!cnc: F. Fama. Random Walks in Stock iV L! rkd Prices. 21 Fi n. An�liysh J .. CScpt.�bct. 1965 . at 55 (clc�cribing the process by which rnarkt:t prok,;sionals i n co r pora t e information in to prices).
" T rading bv information traders also docs not harm liquidity traders. traders whose trades are triggered by changes in price will lose on average when tradin g agai n st insiders or information traders.�9
Noise traders are active but irrational. Their actions are hard to predict. If they act cornpletely randomly they will cancel out the ef fe ct of each other on prices. and. on average, they will not lose to insiders or �' n�1lysts.'" Noise trztders . however. c;o metimes act as a herd. They Cii: he bearish or bu!iish. as a gmL:p. · w ith respect to a specifi c stock: �1 particular industry, or even the rn arket as a whole.51 Whether t he v will lose to insiders or information traders deoends on the time it takes tbe stock to reach its estimated t ''value" as calculated by i n side rs or inform::1tion traders. Suppose insiders anci information traders are of the opinion that the stock Internet.com is over-valued, and thus, sell the stock. Noise traders who buy the stock wi l l lose if they bold the stock until it eventually drops. B ut in the interim period they c an earn a positive return if the stock price contin u es to ri s e. In the long run, however, they will lose, as a group. to insiders or information traders.
Information traders cannot di scern whether price changes are caused by noise traders or by insiders.5' When noise trading is mixed with insider trading, information traders cannot extract in formation from volume or price movements, nor can they deduce the identity of the traders_,_ ; Thus, when insiders are permitted to rationales): Harrv I-k iicr. C!ziun:lla. SEC Rule 14c-3 a n d Dirks: fairness versus Economic Theory. 37 Bus. Law. 5l7. 555-56 ( 1982 ) "It is noteworthy that Professors Gilson and Kraakman have argued that the trading vo l u me or p r i ce move ments may themselves send a message to anal y sts regarding the nature tlt the inside information. especiallv if some analysts can deduce the identity of the inside traders. However, they have acknowledged that this m eth od is the least dficient \\" ay of ach iev i n g efficient pricing because this process of '"decoding" is imprecise: and slow. Sec Ro n a l d J. Gilson & Re inier H. Kra a kma n , The Mechanisms ol· Market Efficiency. 70 Va. L. Rev. :549, :574--79 (1984) . We submit that trade, they will consistently beat the information traders. Since in� formation traders follow prices and react to information, they will always be on the losing side.'' Suppose an analyst. based on the in fo rmation available to her, believes th�1t a price of a ce rtain stock accurately represents its value. Now suppose that an insider is sell i n g the stock bas, �cl on negative priv<He information she possesses, causing the stod: price to ck clin�. The an<t iysL bc illg_ igncn ant of the inside information. will inLcrprct Lhi:s dcclin· .:: as an tm dcrval ua tion and will buy the stock. The sLoc.k will continue.� Lu decline and only after the negative i nfo rmat i o n becomes public will the analyst realize that she bought an overpriced stock. Th e same is true of positive inside information. In!'orm8tion traders cannot diversify away the risk of trading against insiders. and they will always lose when competing against insiders.'' Thus, when insider trading is prevalent, information traders vvi ll be unable to recoup their in vestment in information, and eventually they will exit the market.5' our assumption is more realistic for several additional reasons. Fi rst . it is important to note that Gilson and Kraakmall·s arg ume n t was mack regarding a market from which noise traders were absent. The addition of noise tr:tders makes it even more d ifficul t for anal ysts to isolate informed trading from uninformed trad i ng, thus further reducing the efficiency of decod ing. Second. e mpir ically . the l'casibilitv of decod ing is challenged by the finding that markets do not d ispl ay '·, ;trong efficiency" (i.e .. insiders do outperform the market). See. e.g . . Juseph E. Fi n n ertv , Insiders and 1vlarket E ffici e ncy . 31 J. Fin. 1141. ll4S (1976) : H. Nejat Seyhun. Insiders' profits. costs of t radi ng, and market effi ciency. 16 J. Fin. Econ. liN, 2ll (1986) . That is. a n al yst s arc unabk to detect the n a t ure of the inside information or tu deduce t he i de nti ty of the inside traders duri ng the trade so as tu prevent :1 hnurmal re turn t o insiders. See id. Moreover. even the information a bou t <t lrc: adv executed am! rc pnrted insiders· trades compounded in the SEC's Official Sum!IWIT i.s nnt alway> exha�1stcd hy a n<J i vs ts. See. e.g . . Jd'frey f. JaUc. Special information and Inside!· Trading. -+7 J. Bus. 4LD. 428 (1974) (suggesting that inve�tors can prufit i'rum prompt usc or the Official Summorv). Comp a re Halbert S. Kerr. The hattk of insider t ra d i ng vs. m<�rke t d'ficiency. fi J. Portfolio M�mt . . Summer 1980. at -+7 (us i n � '! stc�tisticai analvsis to show th,1t exce ss returns Gl�l no longer be ga ine d ) . with R;1, monel Goldie &" Keith Ambach tsheer. The b<m k of i n s id e r trading vs. ma rJ.:et c fi'i cic ncv: Com:nc n t. 7 J. Port folio i'v!gmt . . Winter 19Sl. at 88 (concl uding that Kerr's re�ults ··sJww thilt non insiders con usc the Official Sumn/ilrv tu earn excess profi t s signific<1:lllv more often than not''). 
In short. permitting insider tra ding would lead to a market without
analysts. When insiders are restricted from trading, the outcome will be diffe rent. We consider a legal restriction on insider trading that is based on the "disclose or abstain" rule.'' Under thi:.; rut·.:. insiders can either disc!<JS• .: Lhe inside inforrnation they po� .;s .. :· '; ::, ;: ;'ci trade on this inforntation ll! ��. t� !.her \V ith IhC rest Of the lll �1rk; �:-t Or Jbstain from traclinso until s'o mc other le�al Jutv forces them tu cl!:.;c iosc .'·'
Once the inforn1atio�1 is Jisclosed, insiders and inforit�dtion trad�rs compete to capture the value of the informatiot1. iniii�tily. there will be only a fe\v anal ysts in the market who wi1l n: ake abnormal returns on investment in information. In this transition period, the market will be tess efficient and less liquid in comparison with the preceding stage in which insiders were allowed to trade."') Gradu ally, however, the num ber of analysts will increase and competition a m o n g them will bring down the return on investment in informa tion to a competitive rate, thereby creating a more efficient and the welfare of informed u ut sid e rs always declines when the insiders arc tr<Jciing). "Evc:n if one ;l s,umes that a n al vs ts can "decode" insider traclin� or clecl uce the identitv of the inside traders. it is clear th at this process or dccoJing i> slow. costly, and imprecise. Thcrc!'ure. the effect of decoding on our an;1lvsis wi !l be: mcrdy quantitative: D· .
.:cucling wil! oniy affect the degree w w h ich in�id·;rs \\'iii drive: analysts out of the market-rather than zero analysts, t h e re \Vi !l be a.f(�t,· idt. Yet. the process \VC described abuvc rcn-:ains valid. In o ur anaiy·sis. \VC <1ssun1e zen: d ecu din � in order to highlight lllc. tension h� t wct:n insiders and analy;:;ts.
'' \Vc t�1kc: w; given the current regim e prohibiting insiJc:r lr:tding For a :;i�n i fi can t propl"lS<t l to i n1 p rove the exist i ng re gi n1e. liquid market.
'1 In this market, however, due to their superior skills, analysts will beat stock pickers. Valuing information trading over liquidity tra ding, but acknowledging the superiority of ana lysts, stock pickers will respond by buying analytical services from analysts. who will sell rhese se rvice s at a cornpetitive price.
If only a fc? \\' insiders occasionally violate th� �: r· �� st�·ictic)n Ll nd trade on insicic in!"o rnt atiorL the analysts� rnar�:ct C(!n :_ .; t i ll fu ncti· J�i.
Such limited in·;ide: trading diminishes to some e':lcn; the c: pected return ot ana lysts but leaves them a sufl:icient retmn to remain operat1vc.· The e:.:tent of insider trading �eh the oound<; ries of the analyst< m2rket. When the extent of inside:· trading is limited, a competitive analysts' market will develop: when insider trading is extensive, no analysts' market will form." ' This substitut i on effect between iDsidcrs and analysts is the key to unck rstanding the ban on insider trading.
Market pri c es are the result of the actions of all four groups. In siders and information traders follow market prices and counter deviations from their calculated subj ective ''value .
. , Liquidity trad ers who fo llow the buy and hold stra tegy do not d ist or t prices because other market participants do not assign informational con tent to their trading activities. Noise traders, on account of their irrational investment strategies, distort prices. Thus, the accuracy of stock prices depends on the ability of insiders or information traders to counter the actions of noise traders. Th e better info rma ti on t r a ders or insiders are able to counter price deviations c aused by noise traders or by ne,.v!y disclosed information. the more effi cient the market. ln light or Ihis rnarket rn odeL and given the goa! df maximizing the efficiency and liquidity of finan ci a l markets, the quc:stiun be carne�· ; \V hich group�i nsiders or analysts-is better �t blc to attain this goal? "1 Cf. Fishman & Hagerty. supra note 56. at l07 (arguing that ··in,;iLkr tr�1ding le:tds to k�:s efficient stock p rices''). But sec Beny. supra note 27. at 6 (finding that "weaker insider tradin � rcgin1<�S h:·tve . t.. )n ave:rage. less liquid equity lll<.l rkcts'' ).
"S ec Jhinyoung Shin. The Optimal Regulation of lnsick; Tr:1ding. 5 J. Fin.
lntcrmcdiatiun -+9 . .+9 (! 996) (considering the optimal enforcem,�nt dfu n' c1 nd costs in a model including in,;iders, informed market professionals. ami liquiditv traders reveals that "tokrating sumc insickr t ra ding ca n be the optima! regu!att;rv !"J!icy'').
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Tl. EFFICIENT AND LIQUID MARKETS
In this Part , we analyze the con d i t i ons under which c apital mar kets a re efficient and liquid and explain the importance to the economy of attai n in g these goals. In the following Sections, we demonstra te. contrarv to conventional wisdom. rhat analvsts a re " "
superior to !n�idcL' in providin g efficienc y and liquidity to fi nancial markets. In the r-erT1aindcr of this Article, we draw on this impor tar1t insi g ht to provide :1 new economic justification for the ban on insider trading. price of a stock cc>rrc�ponds to its fundamental value").
6; Sec genera lly icl. (describing the value of efficient stock prices and various regulations that attem r t ro promutc effi ciency).
'' See id. at 1005-17. 1017-24. 1028-34, 10l5-39 (discussing capital allocation. market liquiditv. the po t emi a l of management be co mi ng overly concerned about maximizi ng the va l ue of stock rath:.:r than the value of the corpo ration . the n;;turc of the m a rk et for corporate con trol and how inefficient stock prici ng m a y affect it. and other problems or inefficient stock prices).
67 See id. at 1019-20.
"See id. at 1020 (describing the two social costs of losing l i q u idity as the '·transaction co�ts of t rad ing[ ] and the cost of h o l ding non-optimal portfolios'").
For markets to be e fficient , inforn1<1tion about the value of firms
e mcorporater qu1cK y ancl acc urat e y mto stoc.( pnces . This process involves t\VO different tasks: oroduction of informa-
• l tion and pricing of information. Production of infonnarion involves searching for currcni1y unkno\vn i11forrnation that affe cts prices.
fJ ricing q�f in.f'n rn ?orion req tiires a fH·Dces� of analyzing lnforrn.ation in order to deterrni11e it�) value. :;cj thc. tt one n1c1y then trade. based on discrepancies bct\v�.-:: cn price and \' alue. Production of i n fo rmation involves two different t yp es of infor mation: fi rm-specific information and general market information.
Finn -sp ecific infomzarion includes information about various at tributes of the firm , such us the quslity of its man agement, its business plans and past record, its fi nancial position, and the suc cess of the fi rm's research and develo p ment efforts. General market information includes inform ation about the generai condi tions in which the fi rm fu nctions, such as the prospects of corn p etitors, the industry as a whole, and the local and global economy. Divergence of opinion among analysts is spr ead along a spectrum with some degree of correlation since valuation methods share many common characteristics.
B. Th e Relative Advantage of Analysts over insiders in Pro viding
Efficiency and Liquidity
Ejficiency
Production of general market information is costly. It requires searching, sorting, and organizing information from a wide range of sources. Insiders have no advantage over analysts in producing general market information. On the contrary. analysts enjoy economies of scale and scope in performing this task. Knowledge gained with respect to one corporation in a particular industry can often be used with respect to another. and knowledge pertaining to the economy as a whole is useful in analyzing all corporations. In siders do not characteristically produce ge neral market information, and it is reasonable to assume that they will buy such information from analysts.71
Nor do insiders have an advantage with respect to pricing gen eral market information.72 Here, too, it is reasonable to assume that 71 As discussed latn in this Article, analysts will prubdbly br: fu rced out of the market. It is unlikely that the sale of generz,) market information to insickrs would generate sufficient returns to sustain a competitive analyst market.
-, One oft-citt:d e:-;Jmplc is the failure of insiders to foresee the October 1987 market crash. Sec: H. Nejat Seyhun. Overreaction or Funclamtntals: Some Lessons insiders will buy pricing services from analysts. Sti!l. general ma r ket information that is produced and priced by a single analyst who sells her services to insiders will be inferior to general market in fo rmation t hat is produce d a n d price d by numero u:s analysts operating in a competitive market.
71 Analysts enjoy �� g1 •.:ater col lective inforn·latiun b�tsc \v hich gives then1 a great�-:: r !i�-..:!iht--,ncl of pricing accurately gi\·r .:n their uncorrclatcd dilfe ri ng \'c· tlu�tti<J!iS.
Production of fi rm-�;peci fic information is a byproduct of man<lg ing the corporation. The more bus iness changes occur. the more fi rm-specific inform<Hion exists. The cost of producing fi rm-srecitic informatio n has two components: creating business ch�lngcs a n d learning a b o u t them. Naturally, analysts can no t 21fcct business de cisions, so they must l e a rn of changes after they have o ccurre d . Consequently, analysts' production costs equal the resources spent on disc ove ri n g firm -s p e c ifi c in form ation .
Insiders. in contrast, can both affect b usi ness decisions and si multaneously "learn" a b o ut them. vV e call the first L! ctivity '·information-producing management." What is the cost of infor m atio n-p roduc i ng management? W hen insider trading is pro hibi t ed, insiders' investment i n m an aging the firm is a fu n c ti on of their com p e nsati o n p ackages and the effectiveness of the applicable m o n i t o ri n g mechanisms. It is against this benchmark that the cost of information-producing management should be measured. As sume that under a restriction on insider trading, insi de rs will i n ves t $100 in managing the fi rm and the value of the firm will be $1000.
When insider t radin g is pe rmitt ed, insiders \V iii invest additional resources, or divert existing ones, to cause business changes that increase their trading opportunities. Ce rtainly, in ihis c a se . more fi rm-specific information wiJ! be produced. Bm what is the cost of this additional information? This question cannot be <1 nswerecl in the abstract. Since insi de rs may create additional trading opportu n i t i e s either by makin g poor b u si n ess decisions or sound •J nes. one must consider the total effect of t hese decisions to determine t heir desirability. Assume that in siders invest $20 in order to gain $30 in from Insiders' Response to the 1 Yl arket Crash of 1987, 45 J .. Fi n. 1363, 136. 1-6-1 (1990) (concluding from an examination of aggregate insider tran�;actiuns thaL the l 987 crash was largely unanticipated).
'' Set: Gilson & Kraakman. supra note 53. at 581. This is the •.:s.c,c ner: Pl the efficient capital markets hypothe�;is: that ncl analyst will be able to beat the market process.
traclino mofits. The $20 investment may be in addition to the $100 We are left with the "learning" cost of insiders. Because insiders are an integral part of management, the marginal costs of obtaining firm ·specific information for insiders is zero. Moreover, the costs of gathering and organizing such information (for example, account ing) are borne by the corporation in the regular course of business. Theu:fore, no incentive is required to motivate insiders to learn of and process fi rm-s p ecific inform ation.'• Consequently, i nsid ers have an advantage over an alysts in producing firm-specific infor mation. FlO\vever. Lhe rnore firm-specific inform<1tion insiders disclose to the:-rn arket� the less reS( 1Urces analysts '.ViE have to ex pend tc this end. First, the disclosure duties placed em insiders, apart frorn restricting insider trading� reduce the analysts' costs uf proclt�cing fi .rn1-,specific inforrr1ation.':-; Second, even \v ithin the dis-7-l Thr:sc fl:c:!s �L�ggcs1 that the lcga! system should not grant insiders a prop�rty right or any nthc"C p r •.
•pri::� r a. ry entit1crnent in the inforn1ation. Sci� /\. nthony 1�. Kronrn:: · ! iL �v'1 ist<�ke. I::i��cl' ,:':� urc. InftJrn1ation� iJnci the: L�=t\v of Contracts. 7 J. Legal Stud. l, 13--! .:� (1972;) (crguing U1at �)ne \Vht) deli berately acquires inforn1ation rnust be anc)\vcd Lo benefit frcrrn iL, b�it that there is no nr.: :ed !O protect in[onr1ation 2cquired ;:Jsu.ally withour c; deiit·cratc and costly senrch ).
'' Sec. e.g., DougiciS \V. Diamond, Optimal Release of Information by Firms, 48 J.
Fin. IU7L 10 71 (19S5) (demonstrating th:H when the cost of relc::!sing ir.lorrna.tion to the firrn is lD\\·::.:: r rh,�n the aggregate expenditur� incurred by investors to ::�cquire the infonn;,tion independently, wcifarc is enhanced if the firm discloses the information). i249 cre tionary boundaries set by the mandatory disclos ure regulations, the presence of analysts causes corporations to adopt more reveal ing disclosure practices. Since analysts are repeat players in the capital market and can reward good and revealing disclosure prac tices and punish restrictive ones. corporations have an incentive to adopt r· .� \ ealin g disclosure pracLiccs.7'· Thus. at the end of the day. insiders· �l c!V<�ntage ove r analysts, in this r(�:;pcct. will he minim�1l.
As fm :is pricing fi rm-speci fi c i n form a t i on is concernr:: d, insiders enjoy �! rcater proximity to the fi rm·s business, hut they lack objec tivitY. N�..: ve rthelcss. the conve n tio n a l view maintains that insiders have a better understanding of the firm's business. This assumption equates s u pe ri or access with superior pricing ability while ignoring the problem of lack of objectivity. This view is based on empirical findings that insiders constantly outperform the market.77 However, the abnormal returns of insiders do not necessarily indicate that they arc better than analysts at pricing firm-specific information.7'
First, insiders use fi rm-specific information after analysts have priced all available general market information. If insiders had to price both types of information simultaneously, their returns would likely be much lower.7y Second, insiders enj oy two advantages over '" A nalysts c1n punish companies that engage in restrictive disclosure practices by recomme nd ing to t h e i r clients that they sell the stock of such co mpanies-<1 recommendati . LJn that may c a use the stock to crash. This is very simil<lr to the ""\Val l Street ru le .·· " Sec F in nc: rty. ,;upra n o t e 53. �> t 1148: Sevhun. suprJ n o t e 53. Jt 210-l l. '"trading �K tivitv or a cnn fcsscd inside t rader, [v�:m Bocsky, in c�nn ation's stock just p ri or to Nestie"s !904 acquisition of Carnation." and fi n d i ng that "our tests �He u n abl e to d i sti n g ui s h the p ri ce effect of Boesky" s (i.e .. i n fu rmt: d ) purc h asc>s of Cm1 :H1un ., , stock !rum the effect of non-insider (i.e., uninformed) purchases"'). Thi,; result we ak;.; n s the cLJim that insider tra d i n g has a better price discovery process.
"A s evidence t1l this likelihood. one may compare the lowe r re turns of insiuers in large firms-in which the ab i l i t y to have a substa n t i a l <Jdvantage ove r firm-specific information is limited and m acroe co n o mic factors have ;rreater i n fl uence on firms· perfo rmance -with the higher returns of i n si d e rs in sm� ll firms. Th is co m pa ri son su ppo rts om c l aim . Sec. e.g., Thom as Gosnell ct a!., Bankruptcy and I n side r Trading: analysts: t iming and im munity from outside competition."' Insiders can use firm-specific information be fore ;:m alysts gain access to in formation without facing any compcLiti,)n from outsiders.", Thus, insiders' abnormal returns arc not necessarily the product of supe rior t�1lent or skin and do not indicatt" � rh�:r they are better at pricing fi rn1 -specific inforr-r: a.tic.: n.· <� F�athcr. th; · · ;: �: (' rc:turns are quasiof macrueconomic factors): id. at 20 1 (ohsc: rvinc: that ··i nsi de rs in s mal l fi rms earn subst8ntiaily grea ter abnorrn�!l cosrs on the unii." n !!lh :d tr::-tdcr:-; than the insiders in large firms'').
a study of i nsi der trades in the Uslo Stock Exchange -which is a less efficient exch a nge com pa rc.d w;th thc: market' in th�� United States-·'during a pe ri od of lax enforcement of i nsi der trading regula tions . . fo und that i nsi d e rs earned "zero or ncgatiw : a bn ormal " re turns a;-:d we re outpcrt'ormcd bv nwtu31 funds. B. Espen Eckbo & David C. Smith, The Conditional Performance ut ! n:, id e r Trades, 53 J. Fin. 467. 467 (1998) . Simi l a rly, a study of the profitability ()f insiJer t r�1d i n g on the Vancouver
Stnck Exchange-also a icss efficient market thc;n the markets in the United States " wh ere it m i gh t he argued t h<1. t there are large informational asymmetries," fo und that, " d espit e being able to i de n t i fy particular prufitablc insi der trades, the i n si d e rs do not, over all thei r t rades. outpe rform the outsiders . .. Robert Heinkel & Alan Kraus.
The effect of insider t radi ng on average rates of return, 20 Can. J. Econ. 588, 588 Stephen !-!. P·c n m a n . Insic!ct· Tr�;ding and Dissemination of Fi rm s · Forecast I n forma t i on . 55 J. Bus. 479. 49 ! ( 1982) (finding that regi:,tcrecl insiders ten ded to buy ( se l l ) their firm's shares in the pniod immedi<ttely preceding favorable (unfavorable) earnings �; nnounccments and tu sell (bu y ) sh�t rc:< shurtlv after Lt v o rable (unfavorable) announcements. concl uc!in;e thc!l insickrs usc their fcn·ccc; st infurrn�llion in tradinf( and time t h e i r trades relat i ve t':�the fo recast date).
-"W e assume that i nsiders in top positions ctrc abic to avoid co mpetiti on not j ust from outside a nalyst s but from ot her insiders as wdL Indeed, e m pi rical studies reveal the existence of an informationct! hierarch\' efrc ct among Jifkrent insider groups. Sec, e.g., K e nnet h P. Nunn Jr. et �d., Arc some inside·;·:; nwrc ·'inside'· than others'), 9 J. � are superior forecasters of large-greater than eight percent-changes in the pri ces of their own fi rms).
"For an example ur insiders using info rm 8t i on to th<::ir ach ani<tgc at the expense of the pub l i c . see Ji-Chai Li n & John S. Howe. In si d e r Tr;Jdin� in the OTC Market. 45 J. Fi n. 1273. 1283 (1990) (rinding that insiders consistentlv made the right pe rso nal weJith maximizing decision: thev rdraineJ from rurchasing stuck until after the release Df unfa\·orabk information and from S•:lli:1g stock until <t ftt:r favorable information wa� released).
,, Sec, <:: .� . . Bal'.c hot, s u p ra note 55. at 13: Lawr.: nce R. C l usl c n ,�\: p,; ui R. Milgrom. Bid . ..-\ sk �<! nc! "r r,msaction Pri c e s in ;� Spcci<llist \:Li rk• :i with f kterogene � ouslv Informed Traders. l4 J. fin. Ecun. 71. 72 (i985). One �> ;ight ;nguc· th;;t market makers wo uld not be d rive n uut o f the market as a rc:suit ul· inside'! tr:1ding because they could prutcct thcn1�e ! v:::-; by adjusting the bid-ask :=; prcltJ. \Vhilc ;his n:: -�:.-b.:. true. only a small portion uf e� nalysts are m ar k e t make rs. and < : \en this small ptT,tectinn would come at the cost uf iiquiJitv.
'' Sec Thomas .1 . can manipulate t h e timing and volume of their tra cks . <1 f2ct which incre��scs the risk of the uninformed market maker trading a gainst them. By c o nt r ast , analysts, even when enjoying an informationzll auvantctge, will a l ways hold diverging opinions as tu the exact im pact of the information on stock prices, and their trade orders will therefore diverge from one another. This, in turn, reduces ihe risk faced by the uninformed market maker. In addition, because ana l ysts face competition from other analysts, they cannot !l1<tn ipulate or time t h ei r orders. Thus, trading by analysts presents the unin· formed market maker with a much lower risk relative to trading by insiders.
Furthermore, the relative liquidity effects of insiders and ana lysts can be analyzed independently of the reaction of the uninformed mnrket maker to informed trading. Assume a market without market makers, as is the case in several European coun tries." Trading in such markets occurs through direct matches between buyer and seller'' with initial liquidity provi ded by inves tors and noise trade rs.'v Would insiders provi de greater oddirional liquidity relative to analysts? We contend th at the cie2r answer is no. First, insiders have only one subjective vai uation of the corpo ration. \V hen the price equals this valuation, insiders will not trade.'" In a competitive an alyst s' market there is a w i de range of pusi ti\·e relation between bid-ask spread and insider ownership . . and finJing '·no rc latinn between spread and insidcr trading'').
· ·' The Paris Bourse. for instance. '' This is a trading system known as conril/ltOIIS douhl.: uucriuu nwrkers ll'ir/;ow dcsignurcd !uarker makers. The operation and cfl'ccts of this system arc quite similar to that or a cuntinuous market with designated market makers. s,.:: c: Stoll. supra note 70. at 73.
"1 Sec id .
.. , Indeed. one study has fo und that the strongest c\'ickncc of information-re lated tr<tding occurs around u:1espcctcd earnings ch�1ngcs. Ellioll ct a!.. supra note 82, at 528-30. Similarly . Albert S. Kyle shows that in a model with ";1 single risk neutral J On jnsider Tmding diverging, subjective valuations.''' c: onsequently, there is a much gre ater probability that at any g iven time a sub-group of analysts wil l estinBte that the p r i ce deviates from the value. Therefore . 2ln analysts' market creates greater opportunities for trad in g . Second, i:1sidcr� are reluctant to hold stock inventories th<1t will enable thern Ln provide liquidity because they [: rc risk-averse �t rHJ hold undi\·c r·�ir· portfcd ius.'<: �rbcir huiTl an capital is inve:: : l �.. :cf in the corpt)ratioi:. and tht..: on!y \:v ay they can dive rsify is hy placing their finan(ial capilai clsc\vhere . . For this rea�)on, they \V ili be re l uc tant to invest their sa' .,;ings in the same corporation. Analysts. by cont r ast. hold diversified portfolios and adjust their portfolios fre quently , \Vhich enables them to provide greate r liquidity. Third, insiders have limited resources relative to the analysts· market. Since the value of inside info rmation is uncertain, it is dif ficult to borrow against such information. Moreover, it is diffi cult to sell such information to investors due to the inherent conflict of interest between insiders and outsiders. Once inside information is sold, insiders can diminish and e ven destroy its value by manipulat ing corporate decisions and business activities. Analysts as a group have greater fi nancial resources, and they are able to sell th e i r in formation to investors without the conflict of interest problem.�' In sum, because of their greater number of differing subjective valua tions, their superior financi al resources, and their diversified holdings, analysts will provide greater liquidity to fi nancial markets than will insiders.
C. jnsidcrs · J:xclusivi(v or Analysts ' Compelition
As shown above. insiders cio not have an inherent advan tage over analysts in supporting efficient and liquid markets. Tntroducinsider. r�tndnrn noi��� traders� and con1pctitivc r1sk neutral n1arkct n1�1kcrs." Lhc optim�tl trncling k•:ci fnr the i ns ider increases with valudprice differential. Alben S. ing the fact that insiders e nj oy virtual e xclus i vity over inside infor mation completely tilts the sc a l e in favor of the analysts .'!" Granting insiders property ri ght s in inside information confers upon insiders a virtual e xclus i vi ty over the p ri ci n g and proces sin g of this informa ti on .
Kyle. Con t inuuus AuctillnS and
The fact that insiders face no subst:;m\:_:\ com p etition diminishes effi ciency in t\VO r;::atrns: the S<.l lc: \-if t"l r·E11 -:.;f>c_:ci fic inforn1ation and the provision or efficient pricin g and liL:uiditv to speci fic stocks. Be fo re substantiating these c l a i ms, lwwe '/er. we: need to address two preliminary i ssue s : why tht: relevant rnarkd for determining i nsi d ers· market pO\w�r is each sp e c i fic stuck. :: mel why insiders as a gro up are less com p etiti ve than analyc;ts as a group.
One might argue t h a t d u e to s u bs t i t u tio n among individual stocks, the demand for each individual stock is perfectly elastic, and hence it is the stock market as whole that should be the focal point of the analysis rather than each individual stock. The main reason for the substitution effect is that stocks are fungible characterized only by risk and expect ed return. Consequently, the individual characteristics of any individual stock can be replicated by purchasing a portfolio of several other stocks." s Therefore, in vestors can substitute inefficiently priced stocks with insufficient liquidity for other stocks.
This argument runs into two problems: The first is theoretical and the second is empirical. The t h e ore tic al deficiency of the per fect substitution argument is that it assumes a perfectly efficient market already in equilibrium. This theory ad opts a static view of the market and does not concern itself with t he process by which markets attain efficiency. As explained earlier, markets become ef ficient through a dynarn ic p roce ss that involves spotting deviations between value and pri c e and correcting them. Therefore, from the vantage point of inform a t i o n traders. the releva n t market is the specific stock to vv hich this process is applied at any given time.
The empirical flaw of the perfect s u bs tit ution argument stems from 
51-l ( l99l ).
the fact that it implies no correlation between price and volume.
The m arket price remains constam ;·,:;gardiess of the qu ant i t y of stocks t rade d . Empirical studies. however. fo und many incidents of ··price pressure,·' indicating that there is no perfect substitution <l mong stocks. In other worcls, the dennnd curve fL)f specific stoc ks slopes do..,vn\vards t"roLr1 !eft �o rl � .:ht.
in iight of the f�1ct th�-11. there due� nt :l s\.� 1�: rr. to b(� J.i erfcct substi tution among stocks. �n :J given the �1\n�\mic precess by which the market attains efficiencv. the insiders· market power s h o u l d be measured relative to the relevant sto· :: k. not the market :1s a whole.
Even if one accepts that the relc\·:mt market is e2ch individual stock, it may still be argued that imr<t-firm cornpetition among i n s i ders would create a market as competitive as that of the ana l ys ts .
This argument derives from the fact that in many fi rms t h ere are num erous i n si d ers , and competition 2mong them will provide the same efficiency and liquidity as competition among analysts. This argument is problematic for severed reasons. First , in many cases, the employees at the bottom of the c o rpora t e pyramid only have access to small p ieces of information. They do not see the full pic ture th at ca n on ly be seen by t h e managers at t h e top. As a result , the employees at the bottom cannot compete effectively with their managers in capturing the value of the information. Intra-firm competition based on employees holding different pieces of the puzzle is inferior to competition among <malysts with similar sets of information.
Second, the intra-fi rm com p etition argument assumes that i ntra fi rm compet i t i on amon g insiders will actual ly occur. \-V hen inside r trading is open to everyone. hO\ve ver. the managers, wishing to rnaxi mize their returns. will impose Vctrious restrictions on th e i r subordinates to prevent i.hem from trading on inside info rm a tion, thereby curtailing 2ny potenti<il intra-fi nn competition. 
(J986).
[Vol. 87:1229 Th ird, even assuming a legal rule barring managers from restrict ing insider trading by their subordinates, intra-firm competition will not be as efficient as inter-analyst competition. Intra-firm competition will harm the fi rm because it undermines the fi rm's a bilit y to control its intellectual property and its disclosure policy. ;\ cling to rm:ximize their gains . employees ·will diminish and even destroy the value of intellectual prop<e:ny�such <:s re:;earch and dc:elcpment results, trade secrets. �tnd �. ensitive negotiations--to the fi rm by prematurely disclos ing this information to the market through trading. Furthermore, the information fl ow within the firm will be hindered, preventing valuable information from reaching the management in a timely fashion. Unable to restrict insider trad ing by employees contractually, managers will waste resources to prevent trading by their subordinates by other means (either to protect the firm's intellectual property or their own potential prof its). For instance , managers may fire valuable employees for trading on inside information under the false pretense of inade quate job performance. In both cases, the firm will be harmed, either due to damage to its intellectual property or due to the wasteful enforcement efforts of the managers.
Having demonstrated that each specific stock is the relevant market and that intra-firm competition is inferior to competition among analysts, we can now present and analyze the two ineffi ciencies associated with granting insiders property rights to inside information.
In efficient Provision of Firm -Specific information and the

Problem of In tertwining Pricing and i'v!wwgemen t
To see the insiders' adverse imt:JJ.ct on the provision of firn1-spccific information, one must focus on the stock pickers who value information trading over liquidity trading. As a result, stock pick ers create a demand for firm-specific information. Seemingly, this demand may be satisfied either by analysts or by insiders. For the reasons discussed above, though, insiders will hoard firm-specific information, and only analysts will supply this type of information to stock pickers. Assume that insider trading is allowed and ana lysts exit the market, leaving the insiders as the sole source of firm·n Sec supra text accompanying notes 70-73. speci fic information. Economic theory suggests that because i nsi d ers can capture the full value of inside informat[on through trading, the y will charge stock p i ckers supracompetitive p ri ces fo r this in form ation. But th e case at h a n d introduces an additional 'nteresting twist to the s t a nd a rd story.
Insiders wil! disclose inside inforrn <!tion to the market onlv afkr they helve exploi ted its value through trC�cl il<g. Realizing this, stock rickc:rs will cease to trade on inforrmHion �\ nci become. in contrast to their initial pre fe r e n ce, liquidity t r ade rs . An attempt to stri ke <1 deal between stock p i c k e rs and insiders to huy unexploireci fi rm SDecific information will fa il fo r two rea snn s: the inhere nt conflict j ot interest of insiders vis-a-vis stock pickers and the p u blic good chmacteristics of information.
The first p ro bl em stems from the ability of insiders to diminish or even destroy the val u e of the info rmation sold by affecting busi ness decisions. Insiders cannot promise not t o cha n ge business decisions owing to their fiduci arv duties:
'' ' they can onlv commit not changi ng business decisions create still other opp ortun itie s for sell ing the nevvly " produced " information. To eliminate the insiders' incentive to destroy the va l u e of t he information after its sale, in siders will have to make the twin commitmen t s to abstain from trading on fu tu re non p u b lic information and to abstain from selling such fu ture information to a di fferen t buyer. I ns i d e rs will make these commitments only if the expected profit from insider trading is lower than the expe ct ed p rofi t from the s a l e of the information.
However, whe n ever the information is solei w n u mer ous investors, competition among them wiil result in a lower aggregate re t u rn from trad i ng than the return that the insider can make. Moreove r.
limi ting the sale to one group of buyers will present the virtually i m p ossib l e task of trying t o calculate the present v alue of ali fut ure trading profi ts from firm-specifi c in formation. Furtl1ermore, selling the information to a sin gle buyer will j u s t replace one t rue insider with another "artificial insider,,, a nd, even assummg a one-time "· ·· One couiJ ar g ue that insiders could olTer �tock pickers compensation for future changes affecting the value of the information sold. Doing �u. however. is irrational for insiders who could have ca ptured the entire va luc of the:' informarion through 1 rading. sale of all fu ture fi rm-specific information is possible, the d e m an d of stock pickers fo r info rmation will st ill not be satisfied.
The second probiem, the nature of information as a p u b l i c good. implies that insiders will not be a ble to capture the entire value of the information b y seiling it. As a public good , the value of ini'or mation is maximized when it i:�. disseminated to any person \\· hu vdlucs it positi�/cl. y---in C) Ur ::��St�. �t ll stock pickers. Insici,.:rs, hc;\\· cvcr� cannot sin1u.ltaneously re�tch ali the rott:nti(d buyers of the inforn1ation and cb(-trge ther!�. insiders can reach subgroups of buy· crs. for c:xamplc, by a sak tu a tel evision station. but this wii! nut generate a return greater than the return from insider trad i n g .
'vV hen i nsider trading is prohibited, insiders cannot trade on fi rm-specific information, nor can they sell such information. Con sequently, insiders have no incentive to destroy the value of fi rm specific information that is disclosed to the market. In the absence of preemptive competition from insiders, analysts wilt enter the market. Lacking the ability to influence business decisions, analysts cannot destroy the value of disclosed information. Moreover, op erating in a competitive market, analysts cannot appropriate the entire value of the info rmation; they will only receive a competitive return on their investment in information either through trading or through sales to stock pickers. In any case, a market for informa tion will develop and the stock pickers' demand for information will be satisfied.'"
Inejf /cient Pricing and Reduced Liquidity
Comparing insiders and analysts as t\vo alternative su pp liers o! a service-providing efficient pricing and liquidity to a specific stock--reveals that the insiders. being relatively immunized from competition, wili provide infe rior service at a higher price.
Absent rn eaningful com p etition, insiders will take various ac tions to exploit and protect their unique market position. First.
insiders v<� il l util iz e their positions within their fi rms to int1 uence
9"1 As will be explained later, the competitive in formation market affe cted by analysts creates a posi tive externality for stock pickers who value investing ba:;ed on rreelv disclosed information over liquidity trading. Although the efficient m<l rkci thcorv su� !.g· :sts thi s kind of tn1ding can nnt be profitable, mere trading creates utili tv. Under this view. these investo rs can be laheied as noise traders. wili take busi ness oppmtunities prescntc;d to the firm and turn them to t h ei r own advantage): Haft. supra note JS. at 1056 (pointing out tlu:t mc magcrs may " ma n i pulate business decisions 'v ith an 1;; yt.: to po��;;tial trad ing pro fi ts'"). Ch. ILJ96). Although these prugr:nn:; arc t: mpluvcd <1 nd tnforccd by the corporations, t h e i r effectiveness stt:m' fro m the threat of criminal prusecution as well. Under a le£al regin1c ptnnitting in�ick� r tt!i ding. it '.vlll be: n1uch .nHJrc: costly to achieve a si1niTa r level of c o m pl i a n ce fro m employees. [Vol. 87:1229 a piece of nonpublic information is disclosed to the public. Under a rule of disclose or abstain, firms will o p timize the timing of disclo sure to protect their value. Analysts operati n g in a competitive market will react to the new information as quickly as possible. They will immediately price th� information and trade on it lest �omeo n e else beat them to it. In the second scenario, an in� ·; ic.k:r hc>lds cl pi,_::r.: : c: or inside infor m: .nion, together with the pmver to c!ccidc whether and when to disclose or trade on it. If delaying. disclosure provides the insider with better trading opportunities <mc.l increases her expected prof-
Its. s e w1 postpone t .e c 1sc c:;ur�� -onvcrsc.y, It premature disclosure provides the insider with a better oppo r t u n i ty to profit, she will disclose prematurely, even if doing so has grave conse quences for the corporation."" Here. too, the actions \V iii harm not only efficient pricing but also the productive efficiency of the firm.
·whatever strategy insiders employ to increase their profits, their ability to manipulate the timing of disclosure and trading is harm ful. Either the efficiency of the market is hindered per se, or eff�ciency is promoted but only at the cost of quasi-monopoly pric ing and harm to productive efficiency. In this case, the cost of the market distortions caused by insiders is born not just by the inves tors trading in the stock, but also by all the economic actors who rely on efficient and liquid financial markets.
In addition to harming efficient pricing and productive efficiency in order to capture supracompctitive rents, the insiders' excessive market power has the undesirable effect of diminishing liquidity in financial markets. As explained earlier. permitting insider trading will cause information traders to exit the market and consequently reduce the number and volume of trades. This, in turn, wi ll harm liquidity traders, as it will raise the cost and reduce the speed of executing transactions.
'"' Sce Ferber, supra nole 13, �It 623: Seligman. supra nute 13. at 1 121.
'"' Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule lOb-5 . Disclosure , and Corporate Privacy, 9 l Legal Stud. 80 1, 814-81:5 (il J80 ) (discus,;ing th<1l trading on inside infnrmation may harm the corpor�ltion hv providing information at times when accomplishing the business goals rcq uircs sccrecv). One such example is SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co ., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). \\ here insiders traded over an extended period of time before publicly disclosing the discovcrv of ure and before the corporation acq uired all the land. fcl. at 0-+3-47.
Now the choice becomes cle arer. Permitting insiders to trade on inside information will drive analysts out of the market, bestowing upon inside rs exclusive control over the provision of efficiency and liquidity to financial markets. Restricting insiders from trading on inside ir;formation. coupled with corpor�1tc: clisc!osure duties. wiil aUO'.'.' cl TTie_trket of analysts to dcveiop. �/)\ "<'-.. : · .� 1 ! cit�vcioped �1nd conl. petitive iJ nalysts� :narket \:vi ii provide :� up\:rinr effi ci! :: ncy and
] UtCl tty at a 1ower cost. Dec:rite the many vices of granting insiders the right to trade on nonpubl ic information, it does not necess<>rily mean that share holders v\ ill restrict insider trading if left to their own devices. Shareholders. in their capacity as iiquidity tr<:tders , might have dif ferent concerns. Liquidity traders do not lose on average to insiders and they do not care about aggre gate efficiency per se . Li quidity traders will make the same return whether the market has a high level of efficiency or a low level of effi ciency. As long as shareholders can prevent insiders from destroying the firm's value (that is, control the agency problem), liquidity traders do not per ceive insiders' control of the pricing of information as a "cost."
Liq uidity traders do care about liquidity, hO\vever. Liquidity traders and noise traders provide markets with initial liquidity.
Trading by insiders provides additional liquidity. Although lower than the additional liquid ity analysts can provide, the added liquid ity provided by insiders in combination with the initial liquidity '''" The analysis so far was conducted from a market point or view, not from the poi nt of view ot shareholders. Our conclusions h o l d true. howe·.Tr. with even greater force \·lhen the shareholders' point of view is adoptee\_ Given the <H:encv problem between managers and shareholders, gra n t i ng insiders ,; _xclusive co71troi over the disclosure and US<� of inside information in ad dition to their con trol over business activities is potentialiy harmful for shareholders. Di�pcrscd s h a r e hold ers do not monitor managers, and entrusting managers with the role ut monitoring themselves is a sure rccipe for c on t ro l fa ilures. Analysts, in constrast. const<lntly follow stocks and monitor the performance of managers. See, e.g . . Dirks v_ SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 646 (1983) (illustrating a broker dealer who manage J to track clown 21 fraud allegation ).
As we plan to argue in a separate paper, by performing this role, analysts m itiga te the agencv problem be tween managers and shareholders. and thus benefit the shareholders. I n deed . a recent empirica l st ud y has fo und that 92 '};, of the corporations studied enacted p o lic i es restricting insider trading, and 78% adopted b lack ou t periods Juring which insider trading is prohibited. The l a t t e r pniicy resu lted in a narrower bid-ask spread. See J.C. Bettis et aL, Corporate policies re•;rricting trading by insiders, 57 J. fin. Econ. 191, 218 (2000) . These corporations arc most iikely res tri cting i n si de r t r ading because it has a harmful effect on their sharchoidcrs and their companies.
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[Vol. 87:1229 may suffice to provide acceptable liquidity in a particular stock. In this case. liquidity traders may prefer to grant insiders property rights in inside information in exchange for lower salaries.
As ana l yzed ahove, the negative effects of this course of action
arc burn oy the marKet. ven !I l1qutc!Jty t r a ers c1 o not care about dficicncy, efficient pricin g is important for the econcmy as ;\ \v ho!t.:.' '' Efficient pricing is important for the market fo r corpc•rate control. r·u r monitoring an d controlling the management agency problem. fo r the allocation of resources in TPOs and second<1ry of fe rinrrs. and for other t ran sacti ons in the economv that are based
on marKd pnces.
III. POSITiVE EXTERNALITIES OF THE ANALYSTS' MARKET
The introduction of a comprehensive market perspective enables us to bring another phenomenon to light. A competitive analysts' market offe rs several types of positive externalities, of which we will focus on two: the information market and the investment banking industry. In the fo llowing Sections, we analyze these posi tive externalities and show that they would be lost if insider trading were permitted, even subject to a contractual regime. For this rea son, we conclude that the prohibition on insider trading must be retained.
'"' Set.: Nav•.x:n Kh anna et a!., l nsider Trading, Outside Search, and Re:;ource Allocation: Why Firms and Society May D isagree on Insider Trading Restrictions. 7
Rev. Fin. Stud. 575. 575 (1994) (showing that even t h ough insiders' compe tition with inform e d outsiders red uces the " eq uilibrium quality of outside information, . . a!luwing insider trading infl i cts different "social and private co s ts" : com•.:qc;ently, "entrepreneurs may prefe r to allow i n sid er trading even when it is not ,; ocially 642 (1997) , some schol:us suggested that the Su pre me Court's decision has transformed the prohibition on insider t rad in g i n to a nk:re contractual default rule. See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional
Insider Trading Regime. 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1491 Rev. , 1506 Rev. (1999 . \V e dis: .1 gree. A proper reading or () Hagan implies a key distinction be tween inside information in th,.: clciss!c scnse-in forrnation originating from the affected firm used by one of its insiders--and a different tvpe of inside information-i nformation generated by outsiders who <tre not employees of the affected fi rm. While the prohibition on trading involving c l assic inside i n form ation is clearly mandato ry, and cannot be contracted around, the prohibition on tradi n g invol vin g information generated by outsiders is subject to contmcting like any other property interest.
"" Sec Kahan. supra note 64, at 1005-1 7 (discussing all of the costs of ineffi cient m ark e ts and the role of reg u lati o ns in curin g these i ne fficie ncies).
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A. Th e Infomwtion Market
In the analysts' market, some analysts never disclose their in formation directly. Rather, they use their informational advantage through trading. These analysts usually work for major institutional investors. Other analysts, h owe ve r . disclose their findings to the public. Of the analysts in this group. some discl ose information on a regular lxtsi:; as pan of the service they offe r to clients, while oth ers disc1CJs<; oniy part of the information they possess as part of promoting and advertising t h e ir servi ces. The disclosure of analyti cal inforrnation allows market participants to judge, ex post, the 1.
h 1 ,, , , qua 1ty ot Lc <:ma ys t. · The result is the creation of an information market. Financial newspapers, teievision channels, radio stations, web sites, and o th er sources offe r a wide range of fi nancial in formation in a very accessible format fo r free or for a low fee. It is common for ana lysts to share their informational advantage through interviews, private columns, and commentary on these information channels.
Analysts' competition. in short, supports the development of the for saving) and stock pickers (either re sponding to analysts' mar keting efforts and buying their services, or using freely disclosed information as a basis for their own independent investments). In-"" Fo: instance , the fi nanci<il papers publish periodic comparisons between analvsts' recommendations and stock prices. 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 1022. lC23 (1990) (arguing that confidence in the market is important and that due to the effect or diminished in vestor confidence, "insiders are made better off'" if they can ·'precummit not to lr<tde on their privileged information").
[Vol. 87 :1229 creased investment activity increases the demand for analysts and lowers the cost of capital for firms.
Insiders who enj oy exclusivity over i n s ide information thwart the development of the information market. Absent competition, in siders have no incentive to quickly disclose inside information. Insiders do not cat er to clients: they g�1in only indirectly from in cu�ased investment activitv. Morr_: :iy>c:r. insiders cannot sell thei r inforrnational advantage. Severe cunflicLs of intc.rcst and asy1n111et ric information doom negotiation::; buw,::cn insiders and potential buyers. Similarly, an attempt to s.:: li the information to the public (for example, to a television channel or �\ newspaper) will not gen erate a price equal to the value of the information to the insiders because information is a public gooci.'1' In sum, insiders, unlike the analysts' market, are unable to provide the positive externalities that exist in a well-developed inforrnation market.
B. The lnvesmzent Banking industry
To see the effect of the analysts' market on the investment bank ing industry, assume that insider trading is permitted. For the reasons explained above, the insiders will drive the analysts out of the market. Now suppose that a corporation wishes to make an IPO. Insiders will find it difficult to issue shares directly to inves tors. Investors will be skeptical of purchasing shares since insiders have incentives to manipulate the corporation's management in order to increase their earnings.11' Also, there are no analysts to monitor corporations a nd their management or to disclose infor mation, so investors wili be hesi tant to purchase shares in a corporation they know l i tt l e about <:. nd which will not be monitored very carefully.11" Insiders wiil have lo employ an investment bank to underwrite the offering in order to persuade investors t o buy the shares.
The investment bank will have to employ an anaiyst in order to price the shares. The a nalyst will study all currently available in formation about the corporation, competitors, the industry as a 11' See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ukn. Law and Economics 40-4 1 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that public goods are both nonexclucL!hk and nonrivalrous).
11' See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying te:'t.
'1' See supra note 106.
whole, and the economy in general. She \V ill set a price for the shares, and they will be issued. From that point on, the analyst has no use for the knowledge she accumulated regard ing the corpora tion. There is no point in following the stock because insiders will beat outsiders by capitalizing on new inside information. Pri ci ng by insiders. nonetheless. cannot be trusted �� " <l basis fo r 3 secondary offcrin� due to the conflict of intcre:�t pr1 ;l�km. Conscquc nti y . a secondary oll· .:ring will entail similar costs to th�t t of the iPO. Furthernwrc:, without analysts, insiders wllu offe r shares of their corporation will also have to convince investors of their ability to prcwide liquidity. Insiders will be fo rc ed to provide liquidity ar rangements in order to attract invest,Jrs. However, whatever arrangement insiders adopt to persuade investors to buy shares at the IPO, it will ge nerate no positive spillnve rs for other corpora tions going through an IPO. Each corporation will have to offer its own liquidity assurances.
Restricting insider trading, on the other hand, will allow the ana lyst to use the knowledge accumulated in the IPO process by fo llowing the stock and pricing it on an ongoing basis. Efficient, continuous pricing by analysts introduces economies of scale and scope. First, the investment made during the IPO is not lost. Ana lysts can update their pricing, bearing only the incremental cost of the update. Second, the knowledge accumulated in the analysts' market can be reused and deployed in the service of investment banks whenever a new IPO shares similar characteristics with an earlier I PO. The service will be offe red to investment banks on competitive terms. Third, investment banks will fi nd the process of a secondary offering easier and cheaper when the shares of the corporation are already traded in an efficient market in which prices are determined by analystS.11; Ind e ed . under cer ta i n circum stances. even the SEC relaxes the reg_istration and the disclosure requirements for secondary offeringsY''· This is a clear example of Virgin ia Law RcvieJv the reduced costs of a secondary offering generated by the exis tence of ongoing efficient pricing by analysts.
Furthermore. in a well-developed analysts' n1 arket, investors who buy shares in a.n IPO will concern themselves only with the bu�incss prospects of the corporation �me! the qu<dity of its rnan c�g.c n·�o .�'nt. Efficiency and liquidity in the :� ccondary rnarket \'.:iii he pru vid= __ >J by the �.tnalysts. --rhe existenc�.: t_Jf the analy:)ts· rn arkr.:: l cre C1 te:=; ec,'rwmies of scale in this respect as well. Once the rn arkct is in place. it can absorb many nev· i IPOs and secondary offerings. By gu:nanteeing efficient pricing and liquidity, the analysts' market lo\v,·r<.: the cost of issuing sh<:ln.:s fo r all corporations, sparing each individual corporation the ileed to provide efficiency and liquidity on its mv n.
A w<:: ll-developcd investment b a n k i n g industry, in turn. a ttra ct s fi rms from countries with iess developed markets to issue shares and list them in the more developed market. The developed ana lvsts' market and investment industry in the Uni te d States att r a ct fi rms from all over the world.117 This process carries with it man y be nefits: It incre ases the activity and profits of the investment banking industry and its peripheral markets, it provides American investors with a wider range of investment opportunities, and it in creases the demand fo r the services of a n al y sts. None of these positive e xternalities can be realized without an analysts ' market.
IV. THE CASE FOR NEG ATlYE PROPERTY RIGHTS TN 1>1SfDF.
[NFORNlATlON Given the important posi tive externalities generated by analysts ' competition, and given that none of them would arise if insi ders were perm.itted to appropriate and exploit inside information. we subrnit that efficiency dictates that insiders be banned from tradin g on inside information. Com bining this conclusion with the property ,. \V hik non-U.S. companies ra ised only $7 billion in the American nu rkct and "of the -+20 non-don1estic co1npanies registered \V ith the fJ .S. SEC:, n1 ost \Vt� r� �� Can;:�Jian" in ll J8lJ. "in 19')8 non-U.S. issuers offered more than ::5200 billion in the United States ... Lind�1 C. Quinn, evolve.
There remains the question of why the property right should not be assigned posi ti ve ly to a specific analyst. Ex ante, it is i m possi ble to determ ine which a n a l yst vaiues the information at issue most high ly. Allowing analysts to compete over nonpublic information is, therefore. the only viable way to ensure that, on average, the analyst who places the highest value on information will obtain it first. Because analysts operate in a competitive environment to maximize t h e re turn on investment in information, the analyst who fi rst obtains nonpublic information wi ll have to p roce ss the infor mation to the market as quickly as possible, lest she be beaten by o ther analysts \N ho seck the same information. Th e optimal prop erty regime wi th respect to information-the quintessential public good---is one of free competi tion -''� To effect this regime, however, it is necessary to assign a negative property right to insiders to ex clude them from the group of legitimate appropriators. As we 11' 'fh e challenge of ins ide r u-ading i' wickly re rceivcJ ::: ;; one of efficient a!loc:J tion of propc nv rights i;1 nonpublic infor:;1ation. allows us to i l l u m i n a t e the contlicting goals and the tensions in volved in these issues. as well as the parameters relevant to the policy decision that attempts to resolve these tensions.
A. Selective Disclosure
For a variety of reasons, many corporations do not attract ana lysts' coverage.'=" Analysts may overlook corporations because of their size, country of origin, or industry affiliation. In all of these cases, the cost of gathering and processing private information to the market does not guarantee any individual analyst a sufficient return to justify the coverage. The value of the information is dis persed in the market and lost without any benefit to the shareholders.
When insiders are restricted from trading, they may selectively disclose new info rmation to analysts in order to increase the re turns to the sharehoiders. and, indirectly, to themselves.1 2 ' 1n this way, the prohibition on insider trading fosters the practice of selec tive disclosure. Naturally. the analysts \v ho receive the information enj oy a timing advantage over the market, which guarantees them higher returns on their investment in information. In exchange, these analysts engage in continuous monitoring and coverage of the relevant firm and p rov i de the firm \V ith better liquidity and pricing for its shares. In addition, the a n a lys ts provide the firm with better monitoring of the rn anagcmcnt Rnd a vaiuable external C\'aluation of its proposed business strategy.'22 Fi nally, selective dis closure allows manage1nent to (i i:;<.:luse to analysts pieces of sensitive inforn1ation that C(t nnot he d i �_�\Jus� .. �d in their Dure fo rn1 to the w hole market. 123 Such disclosure improves effi cient pricing and reduces analysts' need to expend rcscurces on sea rc hi ng for firm spe ci fic information.
From a property rights perspective. the practice of selective dis closure temporarily p u t s the rights to inside information in the hands of a small group of analysts rather than immediately granting the rights to the market as a whole. In this light, selective disclo sure substitutes "immediate-ali-analysts'-competition" vv ith a '·temporary-selected-analysts'-exclusivity." Admittedly, the tempo rary exclusivity granted to the selected analysts generates the same ill effects associated with insider trading, in particular, reduced li quidity and harm to analysts outside of the selected group. Yet, for smal l companies whose shares are traded with low liquidity, it is a necessary step on the way to competitive analyst coverage. In this sense, the exclusivity generated by selective disclosure is analogous to that created by patent or copyright protection. In all cases, the loss associated with the gr a nt of temporary exclusivity is presuma bly outweighed by the ensuing long-term benefits. The practice of selective disclosure is also advantageous to shareholders because it enables them to substitute the potential gains from insider trading in the form of lower salaries for improved analysts' coverage and superior liquidity and pricing.
Seemingly, analysts outside of the select ed group would iose when trading against the sckcted group, and thus, would avoid trading in that stock. The SEC's newly enacted ban on selective Virgin ia Lu w Review [Vol. 87: 1229 disclosure mandates equal timing of disclosure, and thus, protects the analysts who are not part of the selected group.''' Is the n ew rule desirable? This rule improves competition among analysts, and thus, its effect on large companies with wide c overage b y ana lysts and high liquidity is clearly desirable. Indeed. with respect to such companies the new rule is consistent with our an,liysis.
The problem i�; the effe ct ut" the new rule on srnali comp:tnil>; \V ith !O\V liquidity, con1 p ani1 .2S that t·: .i il tu at�r�lC� analysts� coveret_sc. The equality of timing mandated hy the SEC promotes potential Jcccss to all analysts but sacrifi ces acw�tl access by a fe w sekcteJ analysts. It must be borne in mine!, however, that the out-of-the inner-circle analys ts whom the new rule p rot ects declined to cover the stock in the fi rst place. Thus. under the new equal timing rule.
full-scale competition would not leave a sufficient return on in vestment in information for any individual analyst.
Moreover, instead of the theoretical equality that the SEC is at tempting to promote, the practice of selective disclosure preserved practical equality with respect to the right to become an actual ana lyst of the stock since all analysts could compete over offering their services to insiders. Insiders will prefer to limit the timing advan tage and increase the inner circle in order to limit the ability of the selected group to exploit its exclusivity and improve the analysts' coverage. Indeed, insiders' attempts to limit the power of the se lected group can be inferred from the gradual increase in the number of corporations using "open conference calls,·' even before the proposed regulation that mandates equal timing.1'' Opening a conference call to all interested investors increases dramatically t h e members of the ··selected gro up" and thus erodes almost com pletely the exclw;ivity problem. 
allv. insiders would use such a strate�v only when there is no need to provide a sckcred gm up or a n a l vsts wi th supracon;pctiti�·c rents. Reaching t h i s st:1gc is a gr;�du;�! prnccs,;. initial!v. the stock is n e gl e ct e d and selective d i scl os u re is needed to attract coverage. As p ri cin g and liquidity are gradually i m pro ving. cl ue to the 'el ec t ed group CO\'Cragr:. more an a ly sts and o1hcr infor m �H i on traders :n1cl liquiclity traders arc attracted to the stock. reac h ing the po i n t when there is nu need fo r sel e c t i ve di,closurc �nvmurc. The SEC rule will prevent t h i s process.
127 Sec The SEC's D i scussi o n of P, e gu lation FD, 17 CFR �S 240, 243. 249 (2000) .
"' See L111 gcvuort. supra note :5, at 1040-44. '"' There is still a risk that srn�tll firms will be abusive. We contend that selective disclosure ge nerales important benefits fo r smali businesses-benefits that outweigh.
in our opinion, the threat of abuse. Moreover. these benefits justify relying on the market to control the potential fo r abusive conduct. Similarly, regardless of the possi bility for selective disclosure, in siders can circumve nt the prohibition on insider trading by using non-insider coll aborators. This strategy is difficult to detect. The response is that as long <. l S the legal sanctions create a sufficient de terrent to control and limit the numhc r of violations, an analysts· ll1 ctrl\.r2t can function. En !o rce mcnt d\i· ,··; not have to be perfect; i t just has to be suffi c iently c:lfective: l• �t !-i"c·rd an<llysts a sufficient profit margin. judging from the fluuri:;hin� Cill<liy�ts · market in the United States, t he enforcement syskm currently meets this stan dard.
B. \Va rd;ousing
Warehousing is a practice that enabk�s bidders to gain control of a target corporation by enlisting the h· �lp of a group of related in vestors.133 The bidder discloses her i n t entio n to a selected group of related investors who buy the shares of the targe t corporation.\.;"
When the tender offer is announced, the group tenders the shares to the bidder fo r the premium offcrecL 1'o This group ''\varehouses" the shares for the bidder in exchange for the takeover premium.136
Warehousing increases the probability of a successful takeover by avoidi ng holdouts and shortening the t ime needed for share holders' response.137 Whether this kind of strategy increases consistently l osing these premiums wi l l drive the analysts out of the market. Only if takeover prem[ums constitute an insubstantial part of t h e normal market return can warehousing be tolerated by anaiysts. Om analysis poi nts to a tension between promoting efficienc y in �he 1n�:_rket fo r corporate con trol and prornolin? efficiency in thr.?.
,�(tni L �-tl n: arkct. ff the se!cctcJ grou· r) is cunlDOS•.;Li of anal"i::; ts and f .__ ' ¥ �\'t.:J-�._ -· �tnctlyst c2n c orn pe t e over providing \\' �;_ re housing services to bidders. warehousing is not harm ful to Ll1e capital mar k e t. if, how C\TL the selected group does not include analysts. and analysts h<·:vr: no C' pportunity to compete over the pnJ'.·isi(Jn of ·warehousing servict�S to bidders, the tension m us t be resol ved i n favor of re stricting ware housing. Increased takeove r costs for bi dde r s and lovver returns to analysts are balanced on either side of the scale. Given the myriad benefits the analysts' market produces, the scale should t i p in the analysts' favor.110
Indeed, one might ask why it matters whether the bidder herse if confidentially accumulates the shares of the target or whether a group acting on her behalf does so. Since in both cases the analysts will lose, why restrict direct warehousing? TrUt� , analysts will lose in both cases . If takeover premiums constitute a substantial part of their returns, analysts will need protection from bidders' confiden tial accumulation of the target shares. Initial accum ulation of the shares of the target, however, is important for the bidder. First, holding a block of shares, a foothold, places the bidder in a better position to s u cce e d in the takeover. Second, a bloc k of shares that was bought for a low price provides the bidder with a hedge on her search costs. In the case of losing the target to another p o t e nti al bidder. the fi rst bi d de; : \v i ll make a profit when tendering the block to the new bidder.111 Indeed, here too, there is tension between "" Sec i'v! acey. supra note 6. at 20. Macey argues: i'<o definition of public interest explains ruk l4e --3 . The () 11/r conccivahk e\:pbnation is the private interest ex p lana t ion ofl'c rcd bv Haddock :md �:bccy:
the ruk benefits corporate insiders whose political inllucncc w ithi n the SEC is v�:s:. ly superior to the disaggregatcd, unorganized shart:hulding p�..)pulation harmed bv the rule. hi . (emphasis ;:�deled). Our examin<Hion of the ruk : ;;uggests that the tocus should be on the DWtcction of market analvsts.
'" Sc� Ronalci J. Gilso n. thc restriction on the bidder's own accum ulation, and thus wi ii !> <.;, und;::; r the conditions explained earlier, equally harmful to analysts.
CONCLUSION
Framing the question as whether to award property rights in in side info rmation to shareholders or managers has iecl many commentators to call fo r contractual resolution of the matter. As we showed in this Article, the binary framing of the question has obscured a third, superior option: awarding the property right to market analysts. When market analysts are taken into account, it becomes apparent that the choice between insiders and market analysts embodies a broader policy choice between an ineffi cient and an efficient information market. Granting the property right to insiders will lead to a market with very limited inter-insider compe tition; conferring it upon analysts will create true competition.
vVe also showed that competition among analysts will provide superior effi ciency and liquidity to fi nancial markets reiative to in siders. The improved efficiency and liquidity will prompt greater investment in fi nancial markets, and they will attract international companies to invest in the United States. Furthermore, competi tion among analysts generates substantial positive externaiities for the information market and the investment banking industry. None of these positive effects is likely to arise under a purely contractual regime. Only a vi brant analysts' markets can produce them.
Finally, the broad market perspective we developed in this Arti cle helped illuminate two particular aspects of insider trading:
selective disclosure and warehousing. In both instances, we demon strated that any attempt to regulate these practices must take into account the impact of the proposed regulation on market analysts 
